In the Moment: Identity Shift by Multiple Language Users (Gerald Wesley Johnson’s Dissertation)

Analysis

Johnson initially aimed to illustrate and describe the central components of identity shift, first of all by clarifying what did this term means and then exploring this phenomenon within multiple language users (hereinafter MLUs). His research involved twenty four multilingual participants who showed their transition in their identities from the usage of their mother tongue and during speaking the target language. The primary questions in his research were as follows: (1) “How do MLUs experience a sense of self?” and (2) “How are they perceived by others while functioning in their non-native languages?” followed up by other secondary sub-questions. Johnson’s connection to his dissertation to a certain extent helped to reveal this dissertation’s main communicative purpose. I have identified that the contribution the dissertation purports to make was established clearly, stating for whom it would be beneficial. The main contribution was aimed to be made to linguistics discipline. In particular, researchers, L2 Instructors, language-learning material developers, and L2 learners themselves were among those who were going to benefit from this contribution. Then it was argued for and clarified how exactly those mentioned can benefit from it. Moreover understanding the identity shift influenced by the language in positive ways, hence contributing to material development for second language acquisition (hereinafter SLA) was another significant contribution to the work. The main findings were that there were three types of identity shift that MLUs revealed throughout their interviews
1. Native language-induced identities,
2. Shifts to target language-constructed identities
3. Shifts to subsequent identities following target language use.
These three types were formulated by interviewees’ responses on identity shift, some claimed that identity shift was well-defined, some stated it was transparent, others mentioned that it even was nonexistent. Some respondents made strong yet limited statements that ethnicity played a rather important role in comparison to language in the process of an identity shift.
The dissertation follows a hybrid structure and does not strictly follow the IMRAD format. The dissertation is divided into five chapters followed by the References, Appendixes, Figures, and Tables. The author shows a clear organization and consistent structure in the dissertation. The author starts with the Introduction chapter where it was divided into four sub-sections. I observed that the author uses many personal anecdotes to show his own connection to this work. For instance, one of the sub-sections in the Introduction Chapter is named ‘Personal Connection to Topic’, where the author opens up the reader some glimpses into his life and what led him to choose this specific topic for writing this dissertation. He shows that even though his paper is structured, there is room for some fluency in it. This might be disciplinary reasons or the peculiarity of writing a dissertation in his disciplines, which I assume are Sociology and Linguistics. This might also be the author’s authentic style (it is difficult to say so, as I could not find any other academic papers from this author, which I could compare to this dissertation). The author starts with Move 2 (Establishing a niche) in the Introduction chapter:
Research and writing on second-language acquisition (SLA) is increasingly focusing on
the effects of language on identity and the effects of identity on second-language (L2)
learning and use. Yet researchers do not have a clear understanding of the phenomenon
of identity shift that occurs during language usage…(p. 1)
Then Johnson establishes a territory and finalizes the Introduction by presenting his dissertation. Throughout the dissertation, Johnson uses the structure of ‘from general to particular’ as it can be seen from the usage of the types of rhetorical moves. Apart from ‘Phenomenon of Language Use and Identity shift’ (Chapter four), all other chapters are given usual academic paper names, like an introduction (Chapter One), Literature Review (Chapter two), Methodology (Chapter three), and Results (Chapter five). From the classical IMRAD format, there were some elements of Discussion in Chapter four. Another observation I had made while analyzing the dissertation was that all the chapters except Introduction had a separate Conclusion (Epilogue in Chapter five) part at the end of them. Probably this was Johnson’s authentic structural remark representing his style in the dissertation. While analyzing Johnson’s argumentative sentences I came across Hayot’s Uneven U structure in some of them. One illustration of this is as follows:
The primary focus of this research was to uncover the shift phenomenon for language-structured identities (level 5). Problems arising out of cultural expectations, as identified by Bremer et al. (1996) and Schuetz (1945), surfaced when examining the three categories of shifts illuminated during this study (level 3). Shifts in identities associated with diverse language use supported B. Norton Pierce’s (1995) notion that social identity is not static but rather is a site of struggles that is subject to change (level 2). These struggles were readily seen from the evidence presented by Grasshopper, Sara, Gail, and Waltraut (level 2). Throughout this project, evidence from participants supported Alfred Schuetz’s (1944, 1945) notions of the “stranger” and the “homecomer” (level 3). Gail and Waltraut, as with the approaching stranger, realized that their “thinking as usual” was not grounded in vivid experiences and social interactions (level 3). The ineffectiveness of this thinking caused each of these participants to reevaluate her approach to communicating in the target language (level 4). (p. 119-120)
The disciplinarity in the chosen article is constructed by mixing different disciplines. The dissertation involves not only Linguisticsbut Sociology and Psychology to a certain extent. MLUs and SLA learners represent linguistics while identity shift, identity and different notions constitute Sociology and Psychology disciplines. As I have mentioned at the beginning of the genre analysis Johnson was not strictly following usual academic writing. By this I mean that he was not regularly using passive voice in the construction of his sentence, bravely and actively using pronoun ‘I’ all over the dissertation, for example ‘I reflected on my own psychology’, ‘I emerged from this research’. The author was using personal anecdotes, starting his sentences with phrases like ‘In my looking’, ‘According to my religious beliefs’, ‘My childhood emotional experiences’, ‘It was my perception that’. One of the aspects Johnson managed well in his dissertation is ‘hooking up the readers’, intriguing and engaging them by providing not only the content but also how the dissertation was written:
During the dissertation journey, I moved three times (one of which was international), divorced and remarried, had four different employers, was involved in a life-altering automobile accident, and had nine surgical procedures on my eyes (temporarily losing most of the vision in the right eye). These experiences were significant because of my understanding…(p.127)
While explaining the process of collecting data he makes certain moves that appreciate their participation:
I especially thank the 24 participants who gave so freely of their time, consideration, feedback, and suggestions. (p. vi).
Although this might seem like a small trick it was a new approach to me, and to a certain extent, this connected me emotionally to Johnson and gave some clues to his personality. I also assume that he iceberged the labor the participant had put in, at the same time not emphasizing his presence. The way he constructed the dissertation and the personal anecdotes navigating and guiding the audience on this dissertation were my takeaways. Johnson seemed to follow the advice, instead of an ideal dissertation he had written a mediocre book.


References
Hayot, E. (2014). The elements of academic style: Writing for the humanities. Columbia
University Press.
Johnson, G. W. (2007). In the moment: identity shift by multiple language users. Fielding
Graduate University

Contemporary imperial attitudes: support for imperial ambitions or simply nostalgia for greater power and influence

Response to question 2: “Do contemporary imperial attitudes, as reflected in discourses on the kresy and okrainy, suggest popular support for imperial ambitions or simply nostalgia for greater power and influence?”

I am leaning towards that the contemporary imperial attitudes of Russia and Poland are simply nostalgia for greater power and influence. There are two reasons for that. The first reason is that today neither Russia nor Poland is considered as countries playing a crucial role in the world’s decision-making process (e.g. G7, although Poland is a part of NATO). Apart from the period of colonization and empires, where the world used to be divided among different powers, thus being multipolar, the world evolved to become bipolar (during the Cold War), however, the world we live in today seems rather unipolar with set rules and regulations (with China’s objections to the state of things) in which countries can no longer play as fluently as they used to do. As we see in Kamusella’s (2019) article Russia refers to its western neighbors (Okrainy) as if those only were a part of the ‘Russian World’ (p. 5). One can not state that the modern revival of Russia’s 19th-century empire ambitions had not been successful as Belarus, Moldova, and especially Ukraine fiercely resist and fight for their territorial integrity. For instance, recently, as BBC reports, there were new signs of Russo-Ukrainian war with Russian transferring 20 000 troops closer to its western borders (Okrainy). However soon after Russia was told to lower its appetite concerning Ukraine, with the White House secretary’s “deeply concerning” claim and Angela Merkel’s “de-escalate tensions” warning to Russia (Ukraine conflict, 2021). In the case of Poland, today it seems to have even less influence (subterfuge or ‘fudging’ p. 10) on its eastern Kresy after it was forced to gave up control on those areas in 1945 (Kamusella, 2019, p. 9). 

The second reason is that Poland and Russia (which, besides, under sanctions) are not among hegemons in the world economy and they are not capable of affording their imperialistic ambitions for the greater influence on their neighboring areas. In the current circumstances greater power, conflicts, and possible wars do not pay off, and I doubt that countries that are not even in the top-60 (Poland – 62nd, Russia – 76th) by real GDP per capita (The World Factbook, 2019), will keep on pursuing their imperial ambitions. 

References

Kamusella, T. (2019). The Russian Okrainy (Oкраины) and the Polish Kresy: objectivity and 

historiography. Global Intellectual History, 4(4), 347-368.

The World Factbook. (2019). Retrieved from 

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/real-gdp-per-capita/country-comparison

Ukraine conflict: Moscow could “defend” Russia-backed rebels. (2021). Retrieved from 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56678665

Three reviews: COVID-19: The sociocultural aspects of a pandemic

Writing Review 1

COVID-19 and the other half of the story: the social (William Cockerham)

Professor Cockerham started his presentation by stating the social causes that caused COVID-19. He highlighted that we cannot consider COVID just from a biological perspective, we have to take into account the social aspect of it as well. It was important because considering both social interactions with biological ones would help us as a society to prevent experiencing similar cases in the future. Professor pointed out to history starting from the 1970s when we had infectious diseases appear one after another with HIV (involving chimpanzees) and Ebola (which began with bats). How does the social begin? COVID-19 is a big issue. It was widely known when SARS killed 8,000 people mostly in China and Vietnam. It was the recursing and warning. COVID-19 originated from bats and leaked to human beings. The story with consuming bats comes from the Chinese market’s key feature – freshness. Professor points out, then that those markets for instance have issues with sanitation and are not considered hygienic places (as animals live nearby garbage and in the same cages where they urinate, sleep, salivate). All those factors combined: lack of proper sanitation, feature desire for food delicacies, consuming exotic animals, snakes, birds, rare and exotic were the causal basis of the pandemic. After this case in the market, medical personnel attention in Wuhan attempted to warn the crowd or at least alert friends and colleagues. However, the government viewed these as if they made it up and that the warnings were not true. The pressure of information in Wuhan forced the city to be silent, sharing no alerts, they did not want to be perceived as if they were doing a bad job in front of the Chinese government. Even by December 30th, 2019 there was a  release to the central government staging that no human to human transmission was detected. Professor claims that as of December 31st and till late January 2020 there were 40, 000 people who traveled all around the world from Wuhan. There was a travel ban in Wuhan, information on the pandemic was investigated by locals. More investigation is needed, to prevent future ones. Dr. Cockerham evaluates that China had done relatively well after that as there were regulated strict actions on wearing masks and a lockdown. The social story remains important to investigate keeping distance, staying home, gender issues (as ones are slightly more likely to be infected and die from it). Professor sums up that we need to know more about pandemics. New questions appear as currently the most death from the pandemic is tracked in the US, Brazil, Mexico.  It is crucial to find out the reasons for the death anomaly from COVID-19 in the western hemisphere. It takes time, to reach full sociologically understanding as there is a necessity to develop new research questions and literature. 

I found the presentation by professor Cockerham very insightful and thought-provoking in a way that it helps you understand the pandemic from the social point of view. It was easy to follow the speaker along, as the topics were explaining what comes next in the presentation. Especially it was a pleasure to observe how he connected different notions with the main topic. As when he mentioned that urbanization, globalization, climate change, and closer contact with animals were the prerequisites of different catastrophes. However, the conclusion of the presentation seems to cut short and more attention was on the Q&A part. 

1. It was insightful how eating culture might impact unforeseen issues. Chinese have a desire for hyper fresh and unusual food (cats, frogs, bats) making medicine from animals, freshness is usually associated with recently killed animals and the flavor for the freshest possible food is believed to be the natural flavor.
2. There seems to be a clear connection and it leaves no doubt how the coronavirus appeared: The location coronavirus originated from was the market in Wuhan, it is justified so as from the first 40 candidates, 27 worked on that market including patient 0 who was a 55-year-old farmer.
3. Is it possible to establish an organization that is recognized worldwide, which will have the main function to identify and do everything possible to prevent any virus from spreading to crowds?

SOC725: COVID-19: The sociocultural aspects of a pandemic

Writing Review 2

COVID-19 and the law: surveillance and inequality (Glenn Cohen)

Professor Cohen reveals versions 1.0 and 2.0 of his topic mentioning vaccine recurring cycles in international regulations. So his version 1.0 would cover 6 months from the start of the pandemic and would mainly be discussing an immunity passport, whilst version 2.0 speaks about the situation with the outbreak today and reports on vaccine passport. The speech tells us of countries like Chile, Germany, the UK where the ethical values to travel are connected with license. The situation in May 2020 showed that people were eager to get a chance to show they were immuned. Life plans, support, using immunity licenses, gatherings, work, travel were all linked with so-called immunity passports. There was a dispute on whether to give privacy to schools, there was a need to share information on problematic immunity passports as it could cause inequality. The real and surprising concerns with this were that healthy people were discriminated against, while others were more advantaged (race, disability, etc.). Another dilemma was that would the US continue to pay money for the ones who stay at home.  The professor provided an example of the ‘Yellow fever’ which acclimated and privileged the healthy in the social hierarchy of the 19th-century. Furthermore, the discussion was about medical surveillance and contact tracing smartphone applications of Google, Apple, and other IT giants. The difference between contact tracing models which enabled rapid notifications not and traditional tracing was shown. The contact tracing app its downloading and usage was voluntary in many states and COVID-19 diagnosis was never revealed to individuals, but public health authorities. The app was different than contract tracing. Dr. Cohen then explained the centralized approach (Taiwan) and decentralized method (Apple, Google in European countries) of using the app. There is an ongoing debate on how much individual information should health authorities receive without the individual’s consent disagreement. On one hand the was autonomy and privacy of users while on the other hand there was the effectiveness of tracking. It was impossible to guarantee that people might not detect who the exposed person contacted previously in the first case, and the second case that in future governments will not use the app for other purposes, as systems that were designed for public health purposes might be used for identifying the workplace, law, immigration status, and others. Moving to April 2021 where version 2.0 starts with vaccine passports. The governments created a document that would help safer turn to more normal life (digital heath passes with mandate clarifications). The question here was: do all vaccines qualify for the health passports for international travels (as Sputnik V and Pfizer)? Professor has also mentioned that falsification of results occurs online in black markets. Although no state requires vaccination, it is needed just as a driving license, as unvaccinated have no right to risk others. The dilemma is that vaccines are not widely available to all as 70 countries have not even started the vaccination campaigns (mostly in sub-Saharan African countries). Are we justified then in closing the borders? Due to upcoming elections, it is unlikely that countries that have enough vaccine doses will give them away. More global justice-making and self-interest serve as the melting pot for surveillance and inequality. 

The presentation of Professor Cohen was well-organized and easy to follow along. The issues of surveillance and inequality were revealed in detail. Personally, this helped me a lot to understand the situation with vaccines and their scarcity, especially in the light of the recent situation in India. As a person who also had experience outside academia, he was very convincing in his claims and very clear with his arguments.

1. It was an insight for me to learn how traditional tracing worked. Traditional tracing involved reporting to our health department, assessing the risks, asking diagnosed patients whether they were contacted (by telephone call or in-person), and more importantly not disclosing private information to anyone.
2. Previously I assumed that those vaccinated were automatically listed in the common database, I figured that it was not always the case even in the US. Vaccines provide 1-2 years of protection and there is a need to create a database that would show the vaccine status, as in many countries there was a lack of database records in the US. 
3. Would it be possible in near future to create a type of ‘hybrid’ format of centralized and decentralized approach in terms of contact tracing? Or is it no more crucial issue after the vaccination campaign has been launched?

SOC725: COVID-19: The sociocultural aspects of a pandemic

Writing Review 3

Toward post-COVID-19 sociology (Sari Hanafi)

Professor Hanafi started with a hook on post-Covid premises. He drew an interesting parallel with a period of world war in France where a group of activists worked and prepared a report for the post-war period and named it ‘Happy days’. Similar to this, despite that, the COVID-19 pandemic is not over yet, he presented his post-COVID-19 sociology presentation. Further, typical of what Dr. Cockerham suggested in his speech, Dr. Hanafi explained that COVID-19 was not only a disease. To this, he related his visit to China 5 years ago where he witnessed eating various kinds of animals and bats which as he believes was an effective accelerator of the pandemic. He finalized his introduction with a text criticizing the post-colonial approach and highlighting that scholars play a major role in rethinking the paradigm of secularization and in post-Covid-19 sociology. He points out two issues: the logic of sociolinguistic analysis and the scope of sociology as a vocation. Dr. Hanafi emphasized the role of medical staff and nurses during the pandemic and all the sacrifices they have made. When we look at the scope of sociology as a vocation it starts from the ‘80s when a relationship comes from the distance and moving in, involving social inequality, struggle against neoliberal order, reinventing sociology, redefining and normalizing ethics, love, hospitality, solicitude, emotion, moral impacts, altruism, and solidarity. Professor believes that sociology is about standing with society. Expanding beyond civil society, engaging with non-civic and normative argumentation to the public were among key features. He pointed out that it was not enough to support liberals, but also important to listen to those who refuse to embrace these ideas, calling for a situated critical approach. It should be moved from describing to constructing, but without forcing to assimilate. He provided his observation from a French site where there was a  petition signed supporting de-colonialism and antisemitism. Dr. Hanafi concluded by marking the importance of collaboration of philosophy, other sciences to the International Sociology Association (ISA).  He sees global sociology in three things: declaration of the positionality of the author, biographies, geographies, that will affect the author’s vision; comparison of good methodology and using various rationale; and minding universalism. Dr. Hanafi states that historically there is no sociology without universalism. 

I really enjoyed the structure of Dr. Hanafi’s presentation. There were clearly stated introductions, main body, and conclusion. I have taken notes that we can write down in the slideshow many slides are in each part of the presentation. Although I was sadly discouraged from the text-heavy slides and that the author was just reading them to the audience, overall the presentation was very insightful. Even the presence of the topic regarding the post-COVID period allows us to believe and see the light at the end of the pandemic tunnel.

1. From Dr. Hanafi’s presentation I found out that universalism consists of: 

• Universal concept quasi-cross-cultural consensus;
• Historical experience, democracy trajectory; 
• A universal concept as imaginary; e.g. democracy;

2. Another insight was that there was not a golden standard of democracy. Up until now,  I assumed that the American model was probably the closest to what democracy means. However, after the presentation, I found out that that may not be the case because democracy is rather imaginary. Various aspects need to be considered when a particular country establishes it. There is not a model that you can take and implement in your own country.
3. In the author’s declaration of the positionality of the author’s points, I agree with many aspects except declaring geography. Although I cannot deny that the setting plays an important role in forming one’s identity and positionality, one might move from the place where they were born, or one may dislike their surroundings and position themselves with people/ideas far from their geographies. Should we not consider all these nuances?

Novice Science Teachers: Expectations and Experiences

Genre Analysis

Watson (2006) investigates teacher retention problem in high schools in the US, prioritizing novice science teachers’ perspectives in the research. This project has evolved from informal meetings of the researcher with a group of novice teachers in North Carolina. Stating the conclusions of the analysis it is obvious that after interviewing three novice science teachers Watson revealed that at the start of their career, novice teachers all had similar problems: lack of preparation, endless paperwork, teacher substitutions, concerns regarding management and discipline issues in a classroom as well as lack of mentoring from their experienced colleagues (Watson, 2006). All the mentioned common concerns led to informal meetings of the novice teachers and the results of those meetings were that the teachers made presentations to the school administration. The main objective of this study was to collect data about what issues were faced by newly hired science teachers. The scholar believed that the insights collected would be used to make a contribution to further refine the science teacher education program at East Carolina University. This is because East Carolina University was the main provider of pedagogical cadres to the mainstream schools. Another important contribution was aimed towards teachers’ colleagues targeting that information gathered might also be beneficial to active teachers in the schools. The mentioned contributions are believed to be made to the education field, especially the secondary education pedagogy branch.   

Analyzing the genre of the article I paid attention that Watson strictly followed the standard IMRAD format with a single exception. Instead of a regular Discussion part at the end of the research article Watson favors the continuation of the results, summarizing the interview responses, and outlining the most common findings. The structure of Watson’s research paper is as follows: 

Introduction

Background and Purpose

Instrumentation (Sample)

Findings

Summary

Conclusions and Recommendations

I detected that there was a disciplinary reason for following the standard IMRAD format in this paper. I could also draw parallels in structure between my MA thesis and Watson’s paper. Hypothetically because we both followed the structure of the book ‘The craft of research’ (Booth et al., 2003). I consider the mentioned book as a favorable guide to construct one’s academic parer in the education field. 

Let’s have a look at Watson’s research article from the C.A.R.S model of Swales. Establishing a territory Watson demonstrated that a general area of research is important. For instance for opening up a topic, he starts by making a topic generalization (step 2). Watson starts with a strong statement sentence not supported by the literature. 

Teacher retention is a problem of national concern in our educational system today.

However, right after this move, he supports the statement with three research done in on the field, reviewing items of the previous research (step 3), thus problematizing his initial concern.

Researchers indicate that the greatest attrition rates are occurring with beginning teachers (Inman & Marlow, 2004; Patterson, Roehrig & Luft, 2003)… 

After using the evidence from the mentioned literature to support his argument Watson (2006) then and finally claims the importance of his own research (step 1).

‘Current research has begun to provide some understanding of the difficulties that beginning science teachers face in the education profession.

For Move 2 (Establishing a Niche) the author uses continuing a tradition. As it was previously illustrated Watson wanted to extend prior research to clarify his novice science teachers’ research problem. In terms of occupying the Niche, Watson outlined purposes, announced present research, and indicated principle findings. The only step bypassed by Watson in this Move 3 is that he didn’t indicate the article structure.

There were various rhetorical moves exploited in the research article. Below you can get acquainted with the most significant rhetorical moves used in the research paper:

Introduction	This project grew out of concerns; Specifically;
Background and Purpose	The purpose of this study was to; It was hoped that; It should be noted;
Instrumentation (Sample)	Interestingly; Although;
Findings	One even commented;  This is particularly notable because;
Summary	This may simply be a result;
Conclusions and Recommendations	Why were these teachers successful?; Finally; Where possible; If this is not possible; Research has indicated that;

I noted that there were not rhetorical moves connected with entering a debate as well as the ones critiquing another writers’ arguments. This is, as I mentioned previously because Watson’s research article neglects the Discussion part in its structure. Despite that, there are strong statements used in the paper they are balanced with appropriate hedging. Watson decisively refused to use the ‘I’ pronoun in his research article, which is another similarity to the scholars writing in the education discipline. This is seen in the rhetorical moves used throughout the article. The author had chosen cohesive, mostly short sentences in the paper. The flow and the structure of the paper are also apparent, as the reader is guided through the paper by the logical progression. Watson also tried to catch the attention of the audience by using questions form rhetorical moves at the beginning of the excerpts as can be seen in the conclusions and recommendations part of the research article.

To sum up, the above-mentioned analysis provides some insights into how educational disciplinarity is constructed in this article. Following the IMRAD model, it can be concluded that the current disciplinarity serves as an exemplary design of the structure of the research article.

References

Booth, W. C., Booth, W. C., Colomb, G. G., Colomb, G. G., Williams, J. M., & Williams, J. M.  

(2003). The craft of research. University of Chicago Press.

Watson, S. B. (2006). Novice science teachers: Expectations and experiences. Journal of Science 

Teacher Education, 17(3), 279-290.

Family language policy in bilingual society in Kazakhstan

Introduction: Aim and objectives

Family language policy is not similar to the language policy of the country where it could be regulated by laws and legislation. On the contrary language choice inside the family (just as in ethnic groups mentioned by Leon-Guerrero 2018: 123) varies from family to family mainly regulated by the standards, beliefs, religion, and ideology of the family elders. The situation becomes even more intriguing when discussing family language policy in bilingual society in Kazakhstan. There were two reasons for undertaking this research, first I wanted to explore what factors were important in defining the language policy of a family. Second, I wanted to determine the functions of the language that was chosen for speaking inside the family and among its members. Consequently, two of my research questions were: 

1) What are the factors that define the language policy in a family?;

2) What functions does the chosen language accomplish when spoken among the family members?;

The practical problem in this research is to find out the current situation of family language policy, how it evolves, and what factors influence and shape the choice and changes in this process. I could not find academically reliable sources to observe the issue related to the family language choice in contemporary Kazakhstani society. This is why I also conducted short media research in addition to the interviews I had with parents to collect data on the question of family language choice. There were enough resources related to the language policies in education in Kazakhstan but none related solely to the family language choice. This is the existing research gap and it is important to fulfill it in an academic paper. It is even more important to investigate the problem because as a researcher I believe that the language choice issue in families cannot be untended. Shedding light on this topic might help us to see the broader picture and analyze what direction our society is in from a sociolinguistic perspective. I anticipate that this research will be beneficial to family elders (grandparents and parents) as well as to the researchers working in the relevant academic field. My hypothesis for this research is that the language choice in a family is primarily defined by the ideological assumptions of the family elders and that the chosen language(s) might have various functions among its speakers. I am not in a position to define the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ family language policy, as I am aware of the myth that family and its failings lead to many social problems (Leon-Guerrero 2018: 254). They do not, because every family is a separate case and they have their own reasons to speak or not to spark a particular language. The sections of this research paper consist of Introduction, Literature Review, Research Methodology, Findings & Discussion, Limitations, Conclusion, and Reference chapters.

Literature Review

When we observe media outlets in Kazakhstan we can see that 1348 and 882 of them are published only in Russian and Kazakh respectively (Ministry of Information and Social Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2020 as in Laruelle 2021:101 ) Hence we can agree that Kazakhstan has a mainly bilingual society. As I mentioned earlier, due to the lack of academic resources I conducted media research and in this section, I tried to connect these findings with the core literature of the course. My personal experience and observations of popular social media platforms such as YouTube, and Instagram show that there is a tendency to shift towards the Kazakh language. Popular bloggers (NNN, Ave Adikus), modern singers (91, Kuandyk Rakhim, Amre), famous programs (Talklike, Qaz standup, Bizdin Show, Ozimiz goi), and many other entertainment programs that collect Kazakh-speaking audiences were a strong boost for developing the usage of Kazakh language among youth. I assume that all of these influence the choice of the Kazakh language in contemporary Kazakh families. On the other hand, across the younger generation in Kazakhstan, there seems to be another trend, this time towards choosing English as part of everyday language. For instance, the creators of Yuframe Arman Yusupov and Karina Oksukpayeva who were on the popular list of ‘30 under 30’ projects in Kazakhstan, planned that their son Alim will study English from the age of 3. He has done quite well and now can speak English interchangeably in a family. From this interactionist perspective (Leon-Guerrero 2018: 61) Karina and Arman are helping their children to maintain their social reality. Simultaneously in the situation where Alim started learning English from early childhood, it could partially be referred to as the assimilation process mentioned by Milton Gordon in 1964 (as in Leon-Guerrero 2018: 128).  Luykx (2005) adds that children could become socializing agents for adults by means of their spoken language. However, this is not the case with Alim yet due to his young age. It should be noted that the choice of the family language in Kazakhstan varies from region to region just as in any other country. Can we say that the trends toward the shift between Kazakh and English diminished the role of the Russian language? Probably not. There are controversial points regarding language choice in Kazakhstan society. For instance, I would disagree with Preety Sahu (as in Laruelle 2021: 146) who stated that the Kazakh-speaking people are given utmost priority in all sectors of public life in Kazakhstan. From the position of a Kazakhstan citizen, I would even add that in large cities Kazakh-speaking people might have been discriminated against since the Independence years. However, the situation is changing slowly over the last decade. If you can speak Russian all the doors are open to you in our society, maybe except in some rural areas in the country.

When we consider international experience, the Liverpool football club player James Milner revealed to the world that he intentionally speaks only in Spanish to his children. The main reason for that was that the English player was impressed with people who could code-switch between two or more languages (Marland 2022). His spouse, however, speaks English to their children, they believe that it was a ‘very good gift’ one could give to their children (Marland 2022). What James does seems to me as an innovative model of constituent components of the development of their children mentioned by Sen (1999: 5) and it can also be relevant to the development of freedom where both the evaluative and the effective reasons (Sen 1999: 4). This is because Milner’s children are teenagers now and they, themselves continue to interact with their father in Spanish. Below you can get acquainted with the definitions of the key terms used in this paper. It is challenging to compare the language choices in families of Kazakhstan and the UK, mainly because the countries are bilingual and monolingual respectively, however, this literature might shed light on why certain families choose the specific language for everyday speaking.

Extended families:  It is when two or more adult generations, related by blood, that live together in a single household (Leon-Guerrero 2018: 648)

Family:  The social unit based on kinship relations, a construct of meaning, and emotional and

Family language policy: it is an integrated overview of research on how languages are learned, managed, and negotiated within families (King et al. as in Schwartz 2010)

economic relationships (Leon-Guerrero 2018: 648)

Nuclear family: – it is when two parents and their biological children live together (Leon-Guerrero 2018: 252)

Research Methodology

As mentioned earlier I conducted media research and qualitative research including semi-structured interviews with 5 couples from the Southern region of Kazakhstan. I wanted to learn more about the factors that defined the language policy in their families and in what functions could the chosen language be used. I had prepared sub-questions that were directly relevant to the main research questions.

1) What are the factors that define the language policy in a family?;

• Who decides the language policy in a family?
• What are the internal or external factors that influence your choice of the language used?
• What else would you like to add regarding the factors that define the language policy in a family?

2) What functions does the chosen language accomplish when spoken among the family members?;

• Is mixing (code-switching) the language allowed while using the chosen language?
• What is the goal of choosing a specific language?
• Is there a certain time set to speak one language and then move to the other (after a certain amount of time)
• What else would you like to add regarding the functions of the chosen language in a family? 

I used the simple random sampling method and recruited my participant via Google form with the assistance of my gatekeeper-acquaintances who shared the information. The justification for this method is that every member of the parents’ population has an equal chance of being chosen by this method. A total number of 10 interviewees were interviewed (I have interviewed 5 couples (couples A, B, C, D, and E) including 3 nuclear families and the other 2 living together with grandparents (extended families as in Leon-Guerrero 2018: 253)). The semi-structured interviews were very helpful because the questions did not limit the interviewees, and vice versa allowing them to add more insights to their answers. The main criteria were that the participants were parents between the ages of 30 and 40 and that they were willing to participate in a Zoom interview. Anonymity and confidentiality were ensured to participants, there was no risk of participation and the interviewees were willing to participate voluntarily. The interview questions were available in three languages upon the request of the participants.  All the limitations of the research methods and findings are stated in the Limitations section of this paper. 

Findings & Discussion 

The responses show that there are different tendencies that vary from family to family in Kazakhstani families. For example, couples C and E, which are extended families living with their grandparents, claim that the Kazakh language is the mandatory language that must be spoken in a family. At least when the grandparents are present no one is allowed to use the other language in their speech. Couples C and E believe that it is not ‘right’ to mix the languages (for example Russian and Kazakh) and that pattern contradicts the family values. In both families, the main decision-maker on the language policy of the family was the grandfather and they claimed that no external factors affected their Kazakh language choice. The goal of choosing the Kazakh language for couples C and E was to teach children the sacred element (тіл киесі) of using the Kazakh language inside the family. In both families, C and E Kazakh language was a permanent language of speaking. It was important to mention that both couples were not against any other languages (they even welcomed learning English), but the role of the Kazakh language was dominant in these families. 

The case of couple B was more specific. For instance, the main language of speech in their family was Kazakh as well. However, the spouses were using the Turkish language at times when they wanted to talk about the things that other family members ‘should not know’. This was because other family members and their children were not competent in Turkish. At times when they had guests or quarrels with one another, they also used the Turkish language. Turkish served as an occasional language to them. Both of the spouses decided that the main language in their family would be Kazakh. If the children attempted to use other languages they were welcome as well. State attempts on recruiting the Kazakh language were an important factor to them (Жаңа Қазақстанда – қазақ тілімен). Their goal of choosing the Kazakh language was relevant with trier respect to their identity and ethnicity. The Kazakh language was spoken permanently in this family too. 

There were some common features in the case of couples A and D. The situation was quite similar to Karina and Arman’s family. The difference was that they used to speak certain days/weeks in one language and then switch to another language as the language of their family. Couple A did this by two days a week. For instance, Monday and Tuesday are the days to speak Kazakh, Wednesday and Thursday are the days to speak Russian and on the remaining days of the week, only English could be spoken in the family. Couple D practiced the same strategy for their family. However, they practiced one language during the whole week. It is vital to say that their children were old enough (school-age children) to understand and use the English language. This looks closer to the situation of James Milner, as both of the couples truly believe that they are helping their children to ‘become a better version of themselves and that their multilingual assets would help them in the future. Couples A and D were very flexible with the languages spoken in the family and even pleasant with so-called code-switching. During the interviews, I could learn that both of the couples spent some part of their lives abroad (in the UK and the US) and this factor might have affected their openness and celebration of the diversity of the languages used in their families.

My findings and the discussion of the paper partially proved my hypothesis. We can now see that the language choice in a family is not primarily defined by the ideological assumptions of the family elders. We can observe that the chosen language(s) have various functions among its speakers. As mentioned before there was no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ family language policy. I am now even more confident that every family is a separate case and they have their own reasons to speak or not to spark a particular language. 

Limitations 

There were a lot of limitations in this research. I could only explore the responses of participants from South Kazakhstan, I am unaware of the language choice situation in different regions of Kazakhstan. That is why the data obtained from this work cannot be generalized to the whole family in the country. More importantly, there were time constraints for more quality and broader research. I could only be interested in the topic for the period of one semester which surely is not enough to cover all the important aspects of the language choice policy in the families of our society. There were also issues related to the research sample and the number of selected participants. Lack of the previous research was another limitation. Nevertheless, I could shed some light on the issue and there could be a lot of suggestions for future research on the topic of language choice in Kazakhstani families.

Conclusion 

In conclusion, I can state that the situation with discussing family language policy in bilingual society in Kazakhstan is a unique case. Partially I could find responses to the two reasons I started this research. I know that political, cultural, and other factors were important in defining the language policy of a family. Second, the functions of the language that was chosen for speaking inside the family and among its members may vary greatly from being an occasional secret language up until being a tool for the future progress of the children. Consequently, I could find answers to my research questions.

Even though the practical problem in this research was to find out the current situation of family language policy, how it evolves, what factors influence and shape the choice and changes in this process, the fact that I could not find academically reliable sources to observe the issue related to the family language choice in contemporary Kazakhstani society was one big obstacle. I mentioned it at the end of the limitations but media research in addition to the interviews I had with parents to collect data on the question of family language choice helped me to understand the fact that the term ‘family language policy’ was a new phenomenon to our society. The existing research cannot be filled with this single academic paper yet it might show some directions for the future investigation in this field. 

Reference

Laruelle, M., 2021. Covid-19 pandemic and Central Asia. Crisis management, economic impact, 

and social transformations. The George Washington University

Leon-Guerrero, A., 2018. Social problems: Community, policy, and social action. Sage 

publications.

Luykx, A., 2005. April. Children as socializing agents: Family language policy in situations of 

language shift. In ISB4: Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Bilingualism (Vol. 1407, p. 1414). Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Press.

Marland, D., 2022. “To His Children In Spanish, While His Wife Uses Another Language” 

Retrieved April 13, 2022 (https://www.sportbible.com/football/james-milner-only-speaks-to-his-children-in-spanish-20220211).

Forbes Kazakhstan, (2018) “30 under 30” Retrieved April 18 

(https://forbes.kz/leader/30_moloje_30_1525341811/ ).

Sen, A., 1999. Development as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Introduction

Schwartz, M., 2010. Family language policy: Core issues of an emerging field. Applied 

linguistics review, 1(1), pp.171-192.

Book review #4

The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism (Yuri Slezkine)

In his essay, as Slezkine claims, the author reveals nationalism as a sacred principle of marxism-leninism and how it was supported to create ethnic particularism. The author cites Vareikis (1924) that the “USSR was a large communal apartment” in which various republics represented separate rooms. There were “great power” (titular, civilized, oppressor) nations and small nations (backward, oppressed) despite Stalin’s contradictory claims. Slezkine continues that initially, Soviet ethnic policy believed that nationality had nothing to do with faith. The promoted national form was accepted because there was no national content. Throughout the Union, Marxist schools would have the same Marxist curriculum irrespective of the linguistic medium. The author, then, refers to Lenin who claimed that surest way to unity in content was diversity in form. Many communists (1918-1919) disagreed, appealing for the end of separatism, claiming there was no reason for supporting small backward ethnicities. However, recognizing national self-determinations was a “necessary evil”, which first became institutionalized ethnicity and then legitimized. The article claims that there were nationalities, not nations. “Free national development” was the only way to defeat backwardness, however, USSR acknowledged that after time passes eventually the local ethnicity would dominate Russians in their regions. After a certain period, nationality was mainly associated with a religious confession. Inorodtsy were equal to non-Christians or backward. Soon after aliens and Christians were replaced by narody (peoples), narodnosti (small and undeveloped peoples), natsional’nosti (nationalities), natsii (nations), and plemena (tribes). Thus, Central Asian sarts became “Tajiks” and Uzbeks were redefined to unite all Turkic speakers of Samarkand, Tashkent, and Bukhara. The languages were insufficient, and the 1926 census revealed two categories of “language” and “ethnicity” forcefully creating large numbers of people who did not speak their “own mother tongue” irrespective of whether their mothers could speak it or not. Slezkine finalizes that every Soviet citizen was born into a particular nationality, which was crucial in admitting to school and in employment. He then categorizes that all nationalities were ranked from tribe (oppressed) to nation (oppressor). In terms of ethnic particularism, from all of them, the most advantageous were titular nations who were residing in “their own” republics. Contradictorily in the USSR, there was a coexistence of republican statehood and passport nationality. The former claiming that, for example, all people living in Belorussia would one day become Belorussians, the latter opposing a view against it.  

References

Slezkine, Y. (1994). The USSR as a communal apartment, or how a socialist state promoted 

ethnic particularism. Slavic review, 53(2), 414-452.

‘Why did empires cooperate with local notables at all? Why leave potential adversaries in positions of power and influence?’

The response to the above-mentioned question can be given from different perspectives. One of the reasons can be that an empire might want to create a strong relationship with the sub-states under its control. For instance, appointing its loyalist  Dorji-Nazar tayishi on the rank of viceroy (Khodarkovsky, 2002, p. 140) Russia wanted to ally with Kalmyks against Crimean and Poland (Khodarkovsky, 2002, p. 135). Another advantage of cooperating with Kalmyk notables was to make Kalmyks it’s subject and to add troops to Russia’s irregular military forces (Khodarkovsky, 2002, p. 137). 

Secondly, it can be economical reasons. In the case of Kazakhs, Russia wanted to securing trade with central Asia. Building fort and paying Kazakhs for protecting passing caravans. (Khodarkovsky, 2002, p. 155). Subsequently, the forts served to protect Russian military power into the steppe (p. 156). It was always easier to negotiate with the ‘chosen’ representatives, who then would promote the interests of the Empire informing any potential groups who might decentralize the Empire (Hanioğlu, 2010, p. 73). For instance, during the 19th century in Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg Empires from time to time, it appeared that new national elites from their regions raised the concern of political self-identification and imagined nations. In order to solve this issue and save the territorial stability of the Empire, Abdul Hamid II  started to cooperate with local notables. He tried to implement some elements of democratism, westernization, and secularization in the cost of religious and ethnic patriotism (Kapeller, 2007, p. 43)

References

Hanioğlu, M. Ş. (2010). A brief history of the late Ottoman Empire. Princeton University Press.

Kapeller, A. (2007). Center and peripheral elites in the Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman empires 

(1700-1918). Ab Imperio 2.

Khodarkovsky, M. (2002). Russia’s steppe frontier: the making of a colonial empire, 1500-1800. 

Indiana University Press.

International Security and Conflict: Answering questions

What are the problems associated with a broadened view of security? Give at least two examples of an expanded understanding of security. How might this interfere with or complicate the division between the normative and explanatory role of theory? In other words, how does an expanded view of security conflict with what theory is supposed to do?

The term security is connected with many parts of human life (it generally does not have a fixed meaning), for instance in our everyday life, we hear phrases like military security, economic security, social security, and others. A wide range of different stances within security studies can be its strength and weakness at the same time. Krause and Williams (2018) pointed out several problems associated with the broadened view of security. The first example for the expanded understanding of security can be that the state security may not necessarily mean the same thing for personal security. Secondly, while focusing only on state security it might neglect national identity, state fragility, economics, and environmental security, and other aspects. The expanded view of the security term conflicts with what theory is supposed to do when positive and negative security further leads to analytical anarchy. It happens when we count everything for security. The secured instances can get desecuritized by the reverse processes. The authors also point out that security can be both too narrowly constructed but can also be too broad. For instance, in some countries policing might have become militarized and stretched beyond borders (in cases of recent protests in Belarus and Russia).

According to Dannreuther, what are some of the weaknesses that result in insecurity within the Global South as it relates to civil society?  Can you think of examples of the weakness of civil society within any country today?  What are they and describe them in a particular case.

First and foremost, Dannreuther (2014) claims that the South primarily considers insecurity (or security) as a notion of the internal threat, rather than external aggression (p. 76). This core reason led to civil unrest, repression, and a bigger fear of internal predations. Another reason that relates to the Southern insecurity in civil society can be state formation. As the author claims that understanding of the state in the South is usually perceived as something drawn and given from the outer sides. Besides, Dannreuther believes that on the contrary to European countries the Southern states did not face the existential threats to their survival. All above-stated leads to the three major insecurities concerning the Southern civil society: fragile states, weak civil societies, and challenges of economic integration. All of those three are inherently interconnected with one another. Fragile and artificial states are the ones built upon no consideration of common religious, identical, or ethnic features. As there is no common idea that can serve as a unifying factor, this leads to the creation of weak civil societies. Both of the mentioned factors lead to the third weakness of challenges of economic integration, all of which lead to the insecurity of civil society in the Global South. Sub-Saharan countries like Tanzania, Zambia, and others might serve as samples of the countries with weaknesses of civil society. Although there are many weaknesses in those countries, there are two major ones there, the first being a weak dialogue between the state and its citizens on governmental concerns and weak local representation of the civil society, especially in rural areas being another.

What is meant by the first image in international relations?  Why have scholars in the recent past been reluctant to look at leaders in international relations and their impact on foreign policy and international relations?  What are the constraints that leaders face?

The first image comes from Waltz’s (2001) three images of international relations. Waltz claims that the first image which is an individual level is the least powerful in comparison with states and the international system (the other levels). Horowitz (2018) posited the view that over the recent past scholars were reluctant to investigate the leaders and their impact on international relations due to the two main reasons. First, because the fight between capitalism and communism animated parties interested in international politics (p. 248). The nuclear weapon effect and potential demolishing directed scholars to explore security questions of the world as a whole. Secondly, scholars started using innovative scientific methods to understand leaders better, instead of utilizing archaic studying of leaders’ personalities. Apart from scholars who used the psychological approach, no other theorists were interested in investigating leaders. Horowitz also points out other constraints, leaders faced, at a time they were accepted as ‘error terms’ in politics because scholars found it hard to systematically evaluate the role of leaders. International factors were believed to have a major influence on forming the behavior of nations. Other constraints were that leaders shared a similar belief with the elites, there were the same people who were reporting and informing the leader and their predecessors and the final constraint was the limit within a country, leaders were constrained to the level their countries were constrained.

What is meant by moral realism?  How does this stand in contrast to the “traditional” view of realism as being devoid of morality?  What realist scholars argued from a moralist worldview?

Dannreuther (2014) states the definition of international relations which was actively promoted by Machiavelli, Hobbes, Schmitt, and Mearsheimer being a pursuit of political and military advantage, where the moral considerations were playing an almost non-existent role (p. 60). Moral realism then can be concluded as a set of independent moral values which does not depend on our acceptance of it.  The author also quotes Niebuhr (as cited in Dannreuther, 2014, p. 60) who spreads the idea of reconciling realism with morality, which composes the moral realism. “Traditional” realists Morgenthau and Kissinger (as cited in Dannreuther, 2014, p. 61) contrast their visions with moral realism and admit that there are certain integral morals that traditionally underpin the foreign policy of the US. Another realist scholar Carr (as cited in Dannreuther, 2014, p. 61) argues that while realists stand for pragmatism, the moral realism supporters are pursuing absolute moral goals in the world, where no force regulates the aspects (e.g. would punish bad and praise good). This illustrates different approaches the realists (who recognize plural moral universe, instead of the monistic viewpoint of moral realists) and moral realists have, particularly in terms of prudence and morals respectively.

What three factors does Horowitz tell us are limiting factors in the role that individual leaders can have on the practice of international relations?  Give an example that you can think of as to how this might constrain leaders’ freedom of movement in foreign policy.

Horowitz (2018, p. 249) refers to Jervis, who articulated the belief that leaders do not play an important role in shaping global politics. He points out three major factors that limit the role of a certain leader in the practice of international relations. This is because:

1. Leaders who gain power tend to share similar beliefs as the country due to the macro-influences at both national and international levels.
2. Leaders socialized in office, meaning that intelligence reports a leader receives come from the same agents who used to deliver information to the leader’s predecessor, albeit those people are different.
3. Leaders and countries are both constrained, due to different reasons. Level of power they have, the actions they believe are appropriate in the international arena, and interest groups who play an intrinsic role for a leader to save his position – those are all influential constraints.

Tokayev and Zelensky might serve as reasonable examples of how these might constrain leaders’ freedom of movement in foreign policy. As we can observe Tokayev continues the steps of Nazarbayev in the international arena, prioritizing multi-vectoral strategy. Although Zelensky’s situation was a bit different as he promised major changes in his Presidential program, he had navigated the country by the same Europeanization and Americanization course which was started by his predecessor. Zelensky had also made ponderable changes in the Ukrainian apparatus however, as in the Kazakhstani case we can see that in both cases all three constraints have a critical impact on the leaders’ decision-making.

References

Dannreuther, R. (2014). International security: The contemporary agenda. John Wiley & Sons.

Horowitz, M. C. (2018). Leaders, Leadership, and International Security. The Oxford Handbook

of International Security, 246.

Krause, K., & Williams, M. (2018). Security and “Security Studies”. In The Oxford Handbook of

International Security.

Waltz, K. N. (2001). Man, the state, and war: A theoretical analysis. Columbia University Press.

The Socio-Cultural Aspects of COVID-19 in Turkey

Dumankhan Abdashim, Temirlan Yergeshbay, Nigara Yunussova

1. Introduction

Over the last year up to the present day, we have been constantly hearing such phrases as “we will never be the same” or “the world is not going to be the same anymore.” Indeed, it is almost impossible to not agree with such statements to an extent, because the coronavirus pandemic has turned our lives upside down. As of now, although it may be challenging to predict what other ramifications humanity is to encounter in the long run, it is nonetheless feasible to record a number of significant changes taking place in our behavior. In turn, these changes are likely to lead to alterations in self-perception, leave traces in our psyche and affect the way humans behave onwards. For instance, one of the considerable consequences of the pandemic was the loss of a ‘built image’ of the future and a sense of control over life. The latter is partly driven by the health, social, economic, and political implications of COVID-19 that compelled citizens to revisit their conventional beliefs, get out of comfort zones, and put in their best efforts to adapt to the ‘new normal,’ which is, in fact, an intense and uncomfortable enterprise. In our paper, we attempted to reveal the influence of COVID-19 on socio-cultural aspects in Turkey and analyze its implications. 

2. Healthcare system in Turkey

Before we start talking about the healthcare system, it is imperative for all of us to clearly distinguish the SARS-CoV-2 virus itself, which causes the disease and is referred to as COVID-19, from the broader sense of the COVID-19 pandemic (Ryan, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic has amply demonstrated the vulnerability of even the most developed countries to shocks unseen for decades. In just a few months, one could see that a seemingly ordinary viral infection can cause devastating damage to the economy, education, and healthcare systems and the ordinary way of life of the world’s population, incomparable to financial crises, natural disasters, military, and geopolitical conflicts. In order to assess how the pandemic affected the Turkish health system, let’s first understand how the system works and how Turkey provides its citizens with medical conditions.

It should be noted in advance that healthcare in Turkey has a complex structure. Healthcare services are provided by the government, semi-government and charitable organizations, relations between which unfortunately are poorly ordered and poorly regulated (WHO, 2020). Healthcare receives funds from the government through the Ministry of Finance, social insurance institutions, the Civil Servants’ Pension Fund, and payments from the population (WHO,2020). However, despite some turmoil, Turkey has a well-developed healthcare system. In the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, everyone has the right to social security, therefore, any citizen can receive medical assistance if necessary. The services provided in public and private hospitals and clinics are acceptable and generally available.

Turkey is the third most populous country in the European Region of the World Health Organization and is among the ten largest economies in Europe, despite these facts, the health status of the population and the quality of the healthcare system are much lower than the general level of development of the country (Oortwijn et al., 1999). The medical workforce is the backbone of healthcare. Meanwhile, there are very few of them in Turkey: about 1 doctor for 731 people and 1 nurse for 864 people (Ministry of Health, Department of Strategic Planning data). According to the WHO medical personnel are unevenly distributed throughout the country and in underdeveloped areas, they are lacking, especially specialists. There are several reasons for this uneven distribution of the medical workforce, the most important of which is economic and social disparities between provinces. Geographic conditions, such as climate, and the lack of material or other incentives to work in less prestigious areas also play an important role.

If we talk about medicines and their availability in the country, then Turkey produces some medicines, and also imports from outside. The pharmaceutical industry is controlled by the government. The Ministry of Health sets prices by adding to the cost of raw materials and packaging materials a fixed percentage for labor and management, profits, indirect profits, wholesale profits, and pharmacy profits. The remuneration of doctors depends on the place where they work. Physicians working in the Ministry of Health system, university clinics, or the health care facilities of the Social Health Insurance Organization receive a salary from the state. In addition, they are paid extra from revolving funds, which improves their well-being. In general, public sector doctors are fairly uniform. The exception is those working in backward areas, in particular in the east of the country. The state encourages doctors to work in these areas, so earnings are higher here. Some doctors in the public sector, especially specialists, are in private practice. In private clinics, doctors receive more than in public ones. Unlike government agencies, private clinics pay overtime and night work (WHO, 2020).  

2.1 COVID-19: an overview of the situation 

As the saying goes “nothing foreshadowed trouble”, our life had a familiar way and people all over the world met the New Year 2020. Until a terrible and rapidly developing virus led us to a pandemic. So on January 5, 2020, WHO reported 59 suspicious cases between December 31, 2019, and January 5, 2020 period in the People’s Republic of China (Demirbelek et al., 2020). The etiology of the virus has not yet been known to anyone. And nobody knew how to heal people. The pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing gaps, for example, wealth inequality has turned into inequality in health (Nanda, 2020). Turkey has a General Directorate of Public Health (GDPH), which monitored the spread of this disease in the country (Demirbelek et al., 2020).  Within 30 days after the start of the pandemic, Turkey entered the list of 10 countries with the highest number of COVID-19 cases in the world (Johns Hopkins University and Medicine). The first reported case of COVID-19 in the country was a 44-year-old man who went to the hospital on March 9, 2020. The first relevant death occurred on March 17, 2020. It should be noted that preparations for the pandemic began and continued before the first case was reported. And of course, timely preparation for a pandemic gave a positive result (Demirbelek et al., 2020).   

The Turkish government has taken a smart step towards the pandemic. The country already had a National Pandemic Plan published in 2006 in preparation for an influenza pandemic in the country (Official Gazette, 2020). This plan has been finalized as the National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan, which has been updated based on lessons learned from the 2009 influenza A pandemic (Demirbelek et al., 2020). The plan was originally prepared for pandemic influenza. Despite the fact that the National Plan was prepared for pandemic influenza, the Turkish government has adapted it to the new coronavirus disease (COVID-19), caused by a virus that is transmitted just like the flu (WHO; European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2020). The country has also formed a 24/7 team and a COVID-19 Scientific Council at the GDPH Public Health Emergency Operations Center (WHO, 2020). The Scientific Committee is kept abreast of international developments and representatives meet at least twice a week to present views and suggestions to the Ministry of Health in the light of scientific advances (Demirbelek et al., 2020). In addition, answers to Frequently Asked Questions, recommendations, presentations, treatment algorithms, posters, brochures, and all related documents are updated (Demirbelek et al., 2020). These reports, visual materials, answers to frequently asked questions can be found in the free for every person access on the website, of course for medical workers this is of paramount importance (Ministry of Health, 2020). With regard to diagnostic devices and other medical instruments required for hospitals, all materials needed for sampling and diagnostics were distributed at the central level and by provinces (Demirbelek et al., 2020). COVID-19 training was conducted for both medical personnel and the public. 

Also, various channels of communication such as radio, television, and social media have been used to disseminate information to reach the entire public. Public information materials included information on the disease, prevention, and general hygiene practices, and those who travel abroad were asked not to leave their homes or receive guests for 14 days, even in the absence of any signs of illness (Demirbelek et al., 2020). It should be noted that even from March 12, 2020, permission to travel abroad was terminated for all public officials in order to prevent the penetration and spread of the disease in the country (Demirbelek et al., 2020). Also, after March 27, 2020, all international flights were canceled (Demirbelek et al., 2020). Restrictions on movement in the city were introduced to stop the spread of diseases among the population. Therefore, a curfew restriction was introduced for people over 65 and those with chronic diseases. However, to meet the needs of those who are forced to stay at home, a social support group “Vefa” was created (Demirbelek et al., 2020). The Ministry of Health provides everything you need for protection. So, every citizen, regardless of whether he/she has social security or not, can use personal protective equipment, diagnostic tests, and medicines, and in addition to all, campaigns are held to give out masks to the population free of charge (Demirbelek et al., 2020).

The country was very lucky to cope with the pandemic, as Turkey had a large number of hospitals and intensive care units (280 and 40 beds per 100,000 population, respectively) with a well-functioning intensive care system (Ministry of Health, Republic of Turkey (MoH-TR); Public Announcement of the Ministry of Health, 2020). Controlling the spread of COVID-19 has become a top priority worldwide. Turkey had an excellent opportunity to review the European and Chinese experiences and implement preventive measures to mitigate the pandemic (Cakir, 2020). What actually helped Turkey to soften the blow of the pandemic? So these are organized pandemic activities, rapid hospitalization of moderate to severe cases, free testing, nationwide contact tracing, quarantine measures, and daily monitoring of all contacts through local primary healthcare workers (Cakir, 2020). This maintenance of the healthcare system, despite a large number of COVID-19 cases (n = 117,589 as of April 30, 2020), has successfully affected the health care system without overloading (Cakir, 2020). 

3. Turkey social lifestyle 

The quality of life is always characterized by several factors, such as culture, values and attitudes, living conditions, and health (Akdeniz et al., 1999). Quality of life is an abstract concept that includes individual and social characteristics, and of course the experience of people, their health, and social welfare (Bowling et al., 2003). The World Health Organization (WHO) defines this concept as “the individual perception of the life in which they live, depending on their goals, expectations, living standards and problems within the framework of their culture and values” (WHO, 1995, 1997). The concept of quality of life has received a lot of attention in many disciplines such as sociology, psychology, economics, and politics (Awad and Voruganti, 2000).

In 2019, a study was conducted on what determines the quality of life in Turkey. The results obtained during the study showed that factors such as age, gender, educational status, marital status, income level, work status, health insurance are statistically significant in assessing the quality of life of people in Turkey (Yetim and Celik, 2019). For example, age is an important indicator of the quality of life, and people aged 65 and over have a lower quality of life compared to younger people aged 15-24 (Yetim and Celik, 2019). Another interesting fact is that men in Turkey have a higher quality of life and those who are married are more likely to have a better quality of life compared to widows or bachelors (Yetim and Celik, 2019). Educational status affects the quality of life, as a positive relationship was established between the level of education of people and the quality of life (Yetim and Celik, 2019). It is worth noting that Turkey, in comparison with most other countries, has a low level of a better life index in many ranking parameters. Turkey performs above average in civic engagement and below average in income and wealth, health, social connections, education and skills, jobs and wages, subjective well-being, environmental quality, work and leisure balance, and living conditions (Satici et al., 2020).

3.1 The atmosphere of social life after the invasion of COVID-19

The pandemic has caused extremely difficult and stressful situations both for the world and for Turkey (Karatas and Tagay, 2021). COVID-19 also has a significant impact on mental health, in addition to its impact on physical health (Satici et al., 2020). Countries around the world are trying to slow the spread of the virus by testing and treating patients, tracing contacts, restricting travel and major meetings, and people lose jobs and income without knowing when they will return to normal (Karatas and Tagay, 2021).

Turkey closed all schools on March 12, 2020 (Turkish Science Academy, 2020). Instead, the Ministry of Education’s online course platform Egitim Bilisim Agi (EBA-Educational Informatics Network) and the national TV channel TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation) have started to be used (Kilincel et al., 2020). Given that these measures can cause psychological problems such as social distancing, anxiety, and fear in young people, various psychosocial guides have been prepared for students and their families (Özer, 2020). The uncertain length of the quarantine period, fear of infection, lack of information and being away from classmates and teachers, lack of personal space at home, and financial losses in the family are stressful for adolescents (Brazendale et al., 2017), as a result, all of these events can worsen the mental health consequences of young people (Brooks et al., 2020).

As for urban life, for example, the Turkish government has determined that public transport is the largest network for the spread of the virus and has reduced the number of passengers on the bus by 50% (Ahsan, 2020). The aspect of accommodation for homeless people is also important.

An important human quality during a pandemic is resilience, that is, the ability of a person to achieve biological and psychological balance when faced with hazardous conditions (Connor & Davidson, 2003). According to the results of the study, it can be seen that the resilience of people who have a high level of hope, meaning in life, and satisfaction with life and who have no experience of psychological trauma is higher (Karatas and Tagay, 2021). Conversely, people dissatisfied with their lives had negative outlooks on life and their problems; therefore, it is the expected result that life satisfaction is positively associated with sustainability (Karatas and Tagay, 2021).

Homeless people are at immense risk of infection as well as the spread of the virus. There is no exact number of homeless people in Turkey, but an estimated 70,000 remain homeless (Tezel, 2019). Given their vulnerability, the Turkish Ministry of Family, Work, and Social Services launched the Homeless Shelter (Turkish: Evsizlere Konaklama Projesi) project for homeless and lonely people to provide them with accommodation in government guesthouses or private hostels and hotels in all 81 provinces of Turkey (The Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, Turkey, 2020). Social distancing was the main rule of the pandemic, so the situation with restrictions of parks and public spaces is worth mentioning. While parks and public spaces are a health and fitness benefit, the Department of Agriculture and Forestry has banned barbecuing in gardens, parks, and waterfront promenades, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs has banned persons aged 65 and over from leaving their home, including parks and gardens (Ahsan, 2020).

 In summary, Turkish society is not overly sensitive to the epidemic, according to the study of Kılıç (2020). The Turkish people take protective measures seriously and pay attention to warnings about hygiene, social distancing, and self-isolation. There is trust among the people in the authorities, the health care system, and hospitals (Kılıç et al., 2020). It is imperative that the positive public support for the response to the pandemic remains sustainable, while the authorities should continue to fight through sustainable strategies, policies, and practices (Kılıç et al., 2020).

4. Impact of COVID-19 on culture and education in Turkey

COVID-19 outbreak caused great changes to the culture and education fields all around the world. Those changes required specific adaptations that countries had to get through. In the following two chapters Turkey’s response, as well as the overall impact of coronavirus on the culture and education of this country, will be discussed. 

4.1 The pre-pandemic condition, efforts to respond during the pandemic in Turkey

Primary and Secondary Education. 

After the first coronavirus case was registered in Turkey on March 11, 2020, the school-level education was paused. This pause came in hand with the previously planned holiday week, which allowed some time for the distance learning preparation. Two tools to deal with distance learning were the creation of TV channel sets, namely Eğitim Bilişim Ağı TV (hereinafter EBA TV) (Educational Informatics Network TV) and launching of online education platform named Educational Informatics Network (Akbulut, Sahin & Esen, 2020, 31). In addition to this, some teachers had to switch to other platforms like Discord and Zoom, as they wanted to avoid technical issues appearing on the EBA website. Similar to Kazakhstan, some other teachers (especially in rural areas) switched to Whatsapp for checking homework (Akbulut, Sahin & Esen, 2020, 33). An application Özelim Eğitimdeyim [Special Education for Special Ones] was introduced to the students with special needs. Parents and students in need were provided with a psychological support line. The other major educational policy actions taken by the Ministry of National Education in Turkey were live courses for students in 8th Grade and 12th Grade, revision of the high-school Entrance Examination content, and adapting automatic registration of students, supporting the professional development of teachers via distance education, and finally increasing the production capacity of vocational education and training during the pandemic (Mahmut, 2020). The analyses of whether those steps were successful or not are discussed in the further chapters. 

Higher Education. 

Although Turkey wanted to conclude the coronavirus period with no or minimal loss (just as any other country), Karademir, Yaman, and  Saatçioglu (2020) proposed that universities and students in Turkey had suffered two main issues: infrastructure and psychology. Universities offered students Learning Management Systems (LMS), but those were not enough to conduct online classes, in addition to this inequality in terms of a fast and stable internet connection was another big challenge (468). The psychological issue was addressed by supporting the psychological resilience and well-being of students and parents by launching theme-relevant online programs and student well-being brochures (Mahmut, 2020). Akbulut, Sahin, and Esen (2020) state that students were strongly encouraged to take online education seriously, even launching the hashtag #tatildeğiluzaktaneğitim [#distancelearningnotvacation]. As Turkish universities lacked a sufficient distance education center infrastructure, professors had to switch to mainly asynchronous classes. This in turn raised a question of fair or unfair assessment of students during the pandemic. The assessment system mainly focused on face-to-face classes and the relevant task requirements, consequently, the sudden switch to e-assessment at universities in Turkey resulted in doubts of students about the fairness and doubts on e-assessment among professors and parents (Karademir, Yaman, and  Saatçioglu, 2020, 470) 

Culture. One of the basic responses in terms of culture was the Ministry of Culture and Tourism’s initiating virtual activities about museums and other sites (Özdemir, 2020). This was an effective strategic step as it allowed interested people (who were in lockdown) to keep track of cultural events and participate in them online. As proposed by Mello (2020) the mask-wearing culture has practiced a great shift in Turkey as well. Although at the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak there were no strict regulations on mask-wearing,  starting from September 8, 2020, the Interior Ministry made it mandatory to wear masks in all public places (Karadag, 2020). While there is little primary data and sources on the other branches of culture impacted by COVID-19, there are even fewer articles on Turkey’s response and consequences. Observations from media show that various branches of culture were affected in different ways (just like in the rest of Europe). For instance, like in Malta (Visanich and Attard 2020) artists (and especially pop singers) have to work in uncertainty, thus moving their audience to online video hostings like YouTube and planning their concerts on such platforms. Even the famous, meyhane, tea, and coffee cultures had changed because of the pandemic, and now that all the cafes and shops are closed all the drinks are only sold in a takeaway manner in the paper cups in the streets (Feature: COVID-19, 2021)

4.2 Analysis of impacts of the pandemic on culture and education in Turkey.

Not everything went smoothly though. Akbulut, Sahin, and  Esen (2020) claim that lack of internet connection and technical issues at primary and secondary education level were the most challenging aspects of the effective response to COVID-19 in Turkey. For instance, students who only had access to TV, could not acquire full information on the lesson content due to the cut-off lesson length (34). Speaking of EBA TV, Erümit (2021) suggests that students evaluated it positively and pointed out that it provided learning in place. However, teachers’ lack of technological knowledge and unmet expectations of high school students while preparing for high-stakes tests made the EBA TV experience miserable (17).  Analyzes suggest that parents are another factor that makes it even more difficult to deal with the impacts of the pandemic in school education. A recent study suggests that 83.5% of 25 000 parents believe that formal education was more effective than what Turkey has during the pandemic, hence increasing the workload for teachers (Filson, 2020 as cited in Akbulut, Sahin & Esen, 2020, 38). Another important impact COVID-19 made on higher education in Turkey is that while the objectives of all other spheres changed rapidly the higher education institutions’ objectives hardly changed if at all (Karademir, Yaman, and  Saatçioglu, 2020, 469). Majority of the authors cited in this paper stand for the urgent investments in ICT and related programs to increase ICT competencies at all levels of education for both students and teachers, which is believed to have a better learning experience during synchronous and asynchronous lessons. The following chapters of the paper will discuss the economic and political aspects influenced by the COVID-19 outbreak in Turkey.

5. The economic impact of the pandemic on Turkey’s business and the Turkish government’s fiscal fight against the spread of COVID-19

Undoubtedly, governments have introduced a number of initiatives such as social distancing measures and containment with the emergence of first confirmed cases of infected persons due to COVID-19. States’ reactions to such unknown ‘enemies’ varied in terms of their character and timing, but the popular forecasts expected a drastic decrease in economic growth throughout the world. In the context of Turkey, scholars as Bostan et al. (2020, 3) underline several measures that the Turkish government has taken in order to curb the growing cases of infected people with SARS-CoV2, which included “taking under control the trips abroad, restriction of domestic trips, a curfew of citizens over the age of 65, halting of formal education and its switch to the distance education system,” along with the introduction of the state-led package as Economic Stability Shield. Since epidemics occasionally shock mankind with its unanticipated advent, such occurrences generate dire economic consequences in the form of direct losses such as “lost income and output due to death and symptomatic illness as well as increased healthcare costs” (Noy et al., 2020, 9).

However, we should take such narratives that display COVID-19 as an omnipotent malevolent that inescapably devastates economies for granted, since the available data show that all sectors of the economy were affected in an indiscriminate manner. In addition, the so-called ‘corona-crisis’ has given a tremendous impulse for the emergence of new forms of entrepreneurial activities, while pulling the ostensibly unimportant industries such as agriculture, e-commerce, and digitalization of traditional services to the forefront. If we conduct a sector-based analysis of the impact of the pandemic on Turkey’s economy, “the announcements regarding the implementation of social distancing measures by governments had a direct negative effect on stock market returns” (Ashraf 2020, 7). The study of the economic impact of the pandemic on the stock exchange market of Turkey through econometric tests and a specific model demonstrates that “the most adversely affected sectors are metal products, machinery, and sports, insurance and banking sectors, whereas such sectors as the food-beverage, wholesale and retail trade and real estate, investment sectors were affected considerably less” (Öztürk et al., 2020, 58). The Turkish governors intentionally closed down existing entertainment businesses such as “shopping malls, hairdressers, beauty centers, along with the cancellation of the activities of theaters, restaurants, and cafes, cinemas, sports centers” (Çavmak, Çavmak and Söyler 2020, 8), which constituted one of the largest revenue shares of the Turkish economy.  

  An examination of the financial policy vis-à-vis the COVID-19 pandemic in Turkey, scholars note that the government of Turkey had devoted considerable fiscal assistance to both entrepreneurs and regular citizens, including “a stimulus package worth 100 billion Turkish Liras (TRY) as well as the deferment of tax liabilities, social security premiums, and loan payments, the prohibition of layoffs” (Bulut 2021, 232). Unlike other states that combine monetary and fiscal policies, Turkey combated the pandemic via introducing primarily fiscal policies, which also include “big federal assistance packages for industries heavily affected by COVID-19, social aid payments to support all households, and providing income support for individuals” (Acar 2020, 281).

Besides, with regard to the fate of firms in various sectors, Keskin (2020, 454) notes that companies in “Turkey have realized the importance of localization, thus, such labels as ‘act local’ on social media platforms were used to encourage both producers and consumers to localize.” Regardless of financial assistance to citizens and businesses, some of the short-term and long-term consequences are to generate diverse economic complications for Turkey, including “stagnation, higher rates of unemployment, underemployment, growing poverty in urban areas” (Bugra et al. 2020, 166), accompanied by “current account deficit, foreign trade deficit, and increasing credit default swaps” (Kartal 2020, 493), which may belittle the magnetism of Turkey for foreign investors. As for unemployment, “employment losses are the highest in agriculture (218 thousand) and services (194 thousand) at the time, with an expected economic growth of -5.0%, based on IMF” (Acar 2020, 279). The pandemic has also damagingly hurt the stock exchange market by “decreasing the central stock exchange index of Turkey” (Kartal, Depren, and Depren 2020, 538).

Apart from that, an investigation of the relationship between the house price index (HPI) and the pandemic in the contexts of Turkey and Kazakhstan, Aliefendioglu, Tanrivermis, and Salami (2020, 15) provide certain insights, namely, “pricing of HPI is symmetric both in the long run and short run in Turkey, while the pricing of Kazakhstan HPI is asymmetric in both long run and short run.” Hence, as the citizens of Kazakhstan with relatively stronger purchasing power ‘poured’ their capitals to acquire real estate due to omnipresent fear that local currency would further deteriorate in its value along with constantly growing inflation rates, which positively affected the housing market. On the other hand, the HPI arguably moved in an opposite direction in Turkey, which had a much stronger currency in comparison with Kazakh tenge and considerably lower inflation rates that demonstrate how the existing economic indicators, whether strong or weak, behave and react correspondingly when unprecedented shocks such as COVID-19 take place.

Hence, it is vital to examine whether the economy of Turkey was flourishing to a great extent before the pandemic occurred in order to make a balanced assessment of the consequences of the corona crisis on the Turkish economy. For instance, some experts such as A. Erdemir and J. Lechner suggest that the pre-pandemic financial situation in Turkey was relatively “weak with only 0.9% economic growth last year [2019], complemented with high unemployment rates and Turkey’s involvement in the hostilities in Syria and Libya,” which lessens the prestige of the country from the perspective of foreign investments (Abuselidze and Mamaladze 2020, 459). The latter statement finds its support in an online survey of industrial small and medium enterprises in Turkey, which affirms that “global economic risks and geopolitical risks are of major concern for SMEs” (Asgary, Ozdemir and Özyürek 2020, 69), including their survival and the establishment of new productions in the market. Furthermore, Turkey seems to have already encountered a severe economic uncertainty before the emergence of the pandemic, as “the bursting of the problems arrived in Turkey two years ago due to a crisis of governance [emphasis added], but the global shock, the pandemic, made it difficult to disentangle the effects of global and idiosyncratic problems” (Bugra et al. 2020, 166).

As a result, due to diminishing proportions of net reserves “$105 billion in October 2019 and $26 billion in November 2020, plus the severe impact of the coronavirus pandemic (up to $50 billion), the Turkish economy illustrated that it has become more crisis-prone than ever before” (Taskinsoy 2021, 13). Therefore, Acar (2020, 280) appropriately notes that the role of the government in mediating through its economic sector will inevitably grow immensely, which forces the state “to swing between the free market approach and command or statist approach” that may ultimately create budget deficits. There is no doubt that the economies of states will be driven by “statist-interventionist and protectionist policies” (Acar 2020, 286) for a while in order to overcome the prevailing issues and recover from the largest multidimensional hits that our humankind has ever confronted. 

6. The political and geopolitical realities of Turkey in pre-and post-COVID-19 eras and how they impacted the state’s overall performance vis-a-vis the pandemic as well as its growing role as a regional ‘play-maker’

The political consequences of the COVID-19 on a global scale seem to embrace such enthralling occurrences as the “rise of authoritarianism and populism” (Hanioglu 2020, 24-25), whereby “combat strategies of authoritarian regimes for the COVID-19 pandemic make the society open for the decisions of the authorities” (Alkan 2020, 263). Ironically, the existence of the Toxic Wild West Syndrome, as introduced by Blum, Sanford, and Smith (2021), is a shortcoming of liberal democracies, where the maintenance of human rights (e.g. neither blocking nor charging anti-quarantine protesters) threatens the public health order, but such non-law-abiding or ‘radical’ segment of the population is not amply restricted in their activities because they are the potential electorate that would vote (or not vote) for the candidates that currently administer the country in regular elections.  

In comparison with liberal democratic states, Turkey, notorious with its authoritarian president, Recep Erdoğan, and its country-level classification as “not free,” according to Freedom House (2021), is one of the success stories with regard to its strict health response, hence, demonstrating one of the “lowest death rates (2.4%) due to coronavirus, while displaying one of the best recovery rates of 89%, followed by China and Germany” (Acar 2020, 273). In this specific case, an authoritarian Turkey has dealt more efficiently with COVID-19, which implies a robust interdependence between economy and politics. Scientists such as Aktürk (2020, 313-314) attempt to evaluate the ongoing discussion in academia vis-à-vis the effectiveness of either democratic or authoritarian regimes in fighting against disasters as coronavirus, in particular, he insists that there is no conventional wisdom on this issue. However, dyadic empirical examples of China and Iran on one hand, and Italy and Spain, on the other, show that “authoritarian polities were more successful in fighting coronavirus, though we are also aware that they do not release as transparent data on death per capita as that of democratic states” (Aktürk 2020, 314), hence, any such findings should be treated with caution.

Although scholars as Aybet (2020, 294) acknowledge that it is difficult to foresee the possible world order after COVID-19 from the perspective of international relations, she nonetheless asserts that the role of the liberal world order diminishes, namely, “international patterns of cooperation become less dominated by value and identity-based relations, and become driven more by result-oriented transactional relation focused on needs.” In other words, in the post-pandemic epoch, countries will aim to become self-sufficient through their satisfactory domestic production and perhaps switch to an “alternative needs-based system, where cooperation is technical, short term and needs based” (Aybet 2020, 306).

Also, it is known that the quantity of international organizations prevails over their quality, which was proved one more time during the peak of the pandemic, where the United Nations Security Council, the world’s highest quasi-supranational body available, left the states with a shortage of resources alone in their solitary clash with COVID-19. In this regard, Turkey served as a role model not only for proving its accomplishment domestically by “realizing health measures but also by sending the basic protective equipment to various countries including test kits and ventilators to more than 100 countries” (Akgün and Çelik 2020, 366), which is also complemented by Korkut (2020, 570), who emphasizes Turkey’s “generosity in international aids by reinforcing its soft power.”

It is vital to recall that many of the political and economic consequences are still revealing. However, as of now, sector-based recommendations infer that states are better off by paying more attention to previously lateral industries as agriculture and livestock, which gained a fundamental significance, along with digitalization and self-reliant localization activities. Relevantly, Turkey already has an asset due to its prominence as “an agricultural and animal production hub in the region, with its high production capacity and food security standards” (Hürriyet Daily News, 2020), which enhances its status as a regional geopolitical ‘play-maker’ and a strategic multilayered partner in terms of economic exchanges. Moreover, it is advised that Turkey should keep “diversifying its productions items in the same way and avoid unidirectional growth” (Korkut 2020, 566) as well as begin a systemic work on immersing “Syrian refugees in Turkey into its social and economic life gradually and contribute to production” (ibid., 574).  

Conclusion

The pandemic has entered the lives of billions of people quite unexpectedly and developed in an unprecedented manner. The coronavirus outbreak is not only a massive health crisis but also a harbinger of imminent structural changes in the global economic and social dimensions. It is becoming clearer with every single day that the most important event of our era will be the fundamental split in the period before the outbreak of COVID-19 and the “new normalcy” that would emerge after relatively successfully mitigating the pandemic. In this unprecedented new reality, we are witnessing a radical restructuring of the economic, political, and social order, in which representatives of business, bureaucracy, and ordinary citizens as a whole, have traditionally operated. And, in the near future, we are likely to witness the beginning of discussions and debates about what this new normalcy might generate, and how much its shape will change from the one that defined our lives before. The world must realize that if we are to find a path to a new reality that does not entail excessive health, economic, political, and social losses, then, contemporary states jointly with international organizations, must pursue balanced domestic and international policies in terms of helping the least fortunate states, especially in allocating vaccines proportionately between the Global South and Global North in order win the battle against COVID-19. 

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Book Review #3. Falsification principle

The key takeaway while analyzing Popper’s key principles of good empirical science is the Falsification principle. As suggested by its name any theory could be considered scientific if it can be checked and if it can be proven false. Karl Popper opposes the theories that are taken as common sense and believed largely among the scientific community. He disagrees that certain theories should be taken for granted, and suggests that science has to be viewed from a critical perspective. The heavy emphasis of this review hence would be on the falsification, Apart from the classic example of white and black swans, another example can be provided, as the hypothesis that all the watermelons are red might be falsified if a watermelon of another color is found. His idea of opposing the inductive methods lies as the core of distinguishing real science from pseudoscience. Popper was calling that scholars should not be using induction or inductive methods instead they have to use deduction. The idea was that academics do not draw general conclusions out of any theory, hence doing so is claiming that a certain theory can be true. The case of deductive reasoning shows that any new observation can put doubts on a theory, thus a theory according to Popper can neither be ‘probable’ nor even ‘likely to be true’.  

The proposed falsificationism of Popper relies on the philosophy that theories should be critically tested and demonstrated that those can be false. This respectively leads to a conclusion that a certain theory can be wrong (i.e falsification). Popper also proposes that a falsified theory meets deductive reasoning. Opposed to inductive reasoning where if true premises are true then the result has to be true, deductive argument says if a certain theory is true we should observe, if we see any exclusions then that theory is false. Let me provide an example with four different milk bottles on a shelf. If four bottles of milk on a shelf stay five days on a shelf then those milk bottles become sour. Could this theory be falsified? Easily! The problem with deduction is that you have to make assumptions, which either rely on induction or on uncritical acceptance. How do we know for example that some of the milk bottles were not initially sour, or what if the temperature on the shelf was cold enough to keep the bottles fresh?! Poppers can be wrong in that scholars should only seek falsification in their theories, and that to my mind leads to the understanding that falsification is not an alternative to induction. 

I would also touch upon Dryer’s work and concentrate on his explanation of the relation between the basic linguistic theory and a descriptive approach. I certainly posit the same view with Dryer’s ideas about theories for linguistic analysis, which overall lead to the idea that both theoretical frameworks and descriptions them describe certain facts. Probably more importantly they demonstrate the source of data for theories in typology, sometimes without further implications.

References 

Dryer, M. S. (2008). Descriptive theories, explanatory theories, and basic linguistic theory. In 

Catching language (pp. 207-234). De Gruyter Mouton.

Popper, K. (2005). The logic of scientific discovery. Routledge.